

United States Senate

September 9, 2024

Inspector General Joseph Cuffari
Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 0305
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

Dear Inspector General Cuffari,

I applaud your efforts in leading multiple investigations into the security failures surrounding the attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) is uniquely authorized and equipped to fully examine the United States Secret Service (USSS) processes and personnel that contributed to the USSS landmark operational failure, and I acknowledge that your office has initiated the following three probes:

Title	Scope
Secret Service's Process for Securing Former President Trump's July 13, 2024 Event	Evaluate the United States Secret Service's (Secret Service) process for securing former President Trump's July 13, 2024 campaign event.
U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Preparedness and Operations	To determine the extent to which the USSS Counter Sniper Team is prepared to respond to threats at events attended by designated protectees.
U.S. Secret Service Planning and Implementation Activities for Protective Operations	To determine the extent to which the Secret Service's planning and implementation activities ensures the safety and security of designated protectees. ¹

I anticipate that your evaluations will include comprehensive assessments of policies, procedures, communications, human errors, and all aspects about the USSS protection responsibilities that contributed to the failure of the July 13, 2024 event. USSS protection procedures are not transparent to the American people, even following two recent Congressional

¹ "Ongoing Projects," Ongoing Projects | Office of Inspector General, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/ongoing-projects?field_project_dhs_component_value=Secret%2BService&field_project_mission_value=8.

hearings during which my colleagues and I posed probing questions to the USSS Director and Acting Director, only to receive unsatisfactory nonanswers. I request your forthcoming reports address this ambiguity, as well as include clarification and supplemental information to the following points.

Investigate Denied Requests

In the days and weeks following the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of President Trump, new reports surfaced revealing that President Trump's campaign was aware of serious security deficiencies at his events, which fell under the USSS purview. Additional protection assets, including personnel, were requested either of DHS Secretary Mayorkas or from the USSS to provide for President Trump's safety.

The Washington Post reported that the Trump campaign and the agents charged with protecting President Trump "requested magnetometers and more agents to screen attendees at sporting events and other large public gatherings Trump attended, as well as additional snipers and specialty teams at other outdoor events."² Reported events for which the Trump campaign requested more protective USSS resources include a July 2023 outdoor rally in Pickens, South Carolina, and multiple times President Trump has attended sporting events, such as football games and wrestling matches.³

The USSS initially claimed that it was attentive to the Trump campaign security concerns and had "added protective resources & technology & capabilities"⁴ to President Trump's protective unit. However, this claim was later refuted, as the USSS repeatedly denied additional protective resources to the Trump campaign. The USSS provided a variety of justifications for these denials, including staffing shortages, hiring limits and assessing gatherings as "not campaign events."⁵

For these reasons, please expand the scope of your work to investigate reports that multiple requests for USSS protection assets or increased assets were denied for President Donald J. Trump, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.,⁶ and potentially others who sought USSS protection while running for public office. The probe should fully audit at least the three years preceding July 13, 2024, explaining in detail the request itself and why it was either approved or denied. Please release any accompanying documentation to these requests.

² Josh Dawsey and Carol Leoning, "Secret Service Said to Have Denied Trump Requests for More Event Security," The Washington Post, July 20, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/07/20/trump-secret-service-security-attempted-assassination/>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Anthony Guglielmi (@SecretSvcSpox), "Theres an untrue assertion that a member of the former President's team requested additional security resources & that those were rebuffed. This is absolutely f", Twitter, July 14, 2024, 7:38 am, <https://x.com/SecretSvcSpox/status/1812451649387933912>.

⁵ Josh Dawsey and Carol Leoning, "Secret Service Said to Have Denied Trump Requests for More Event Security," The Washington Post, July 20, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/07/20/trump-secret-service-security-attempted-assassination/>.

⁶ Chris Cameron, "Kennedy Calls for Secret Service Detail on Anniversary of Father's Killing," The New York Times, June 6, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/05/us/politics/rfk-jr-secret-service.html>.

Examine Individual Position Responsibilities

I also request that you examine the role of every individual responsible for decisions involving all aspects of protective operations to determine if each individual's responsibilities are clear and unambiguous. Even when the USSS procedures prescribe decisions by consensus, a single individual must be identified who has the final authority and responsibility for every consensus-advised decision. If individual responsibilities are unclear, I ask that your office recommend appropriate procedural or position changes that will create definitive individual decision-making responsibilities for each individual contribution to protective operation decisions.

To highlight this point, when I questioned Acting USSS Director Ronald Rowe during a June 30, 2024 Senate hearing, I repeatedly asked for the name of the individual responsible for making protective resource allocation decisions. Acting Director Rowe never confirmed if an individual position accountable for decisions within the USSS exists and instead testified that a "process" encompassing "a conversation between the detailee, the field office, the Office of Protective Operations, and the Office of Investigations" decides protection plans.⁷ Because of Acting Director Rowe's imprecise response, I still have no clarity regarding internal USSS decision-making processes and who ultimately approves or denies requests for protective resources. The American people deserve clarity on this matter.

Additionally, I also ask that your office launch an investigation into USSS personnel assignments involving President Trump, a high risk protectee, and examine how often USSS agents with performance problems have been assigned to his events. For example, informants told my office that the agent who recently abandoned her protection post to nurse her child without approval⁸ was out of USSS policy compliance and may be subjected to disciplinary actions. As such, I ask that you examine the agent's performance history to include any ongoing or prior Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) actions, and also evaluate which USSS management official(s) knew about the agent's allegedly troubled performance record yet still assigned her to President Trump's event.

Accounting of USSS Personnel Attrition

Finally, I ask that your office conducts a thorough accounting of USSS staffing resignations, retirements, and all separations from duty during the prior 4 years. Social media and other public reporting implies that 48 percent of the USSS workforce departed in 2022, which, if true, represents a catastrophic loss of expertise.⁹ When questioned about this, Acting Director Rowe

⁷ "Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump," Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, July 30, 2024, <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/examination-of-the-security-failures-leading-to-the-assassination-attempt-on-former-president-trump-2/>.

⁸ Stepheny Price, "Secret Service Investigating Report Agent Left Post to Breastfeed during Trump Campaign Event," Fox News, August 15, 2024, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/secret-service-investigating-report-agent-left-post-breastfeed-trump-campaign-event>.

⁹ Adriana Diaz, Analisa Novak, and Andres Triay, "Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle Addresses Controversies, Challenges Facing the Agency," CBS News, May 18, 2023, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/secret-service-director-kimberly-cheatle-controversies-challenges/>.

answered he would get me accurate information regarding the USSS workforce.¹⁰ However, to date, I have not received any clarity from Acting Director Rowe.

Requests for Information

In line with my requests for additional DHS OIG investigative probes, please provide the following documentation to my office by September 27, 2024:

1. All records related to denied protection for President Trump, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr, and any other protectee denied protection resources in the three years prior to July 13, 2024.
2. A detailed organizational chart including all individual or consensus responsibilities for protective operation resource allocations.
3. Assessment of adverse actions under consideration for the USSS agent who violated protocols and potentially federal law by abandoning her post and inviting family members into secured space.
4. Attrition data for all USSS talent departures, aggregated by job category in each calendar year beginning January 2020 and in each fiscal year beginning in FY21.

I appreciate your swift attention to this matter and look forward to receiving your responses.

Sincerely,



Roger Marshall, M.D.
United States Senator

¹⁰ “Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump,” Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, July 30, 2024, <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/examination-of-the-security-failures-leading-to-the-assassination-attempt-on-former-president-trump-2/>.